If yo u can trust him, there would be many advantages in employing him; first his being on the spot and knowing all that has been done and the nature of the warfare; secondly his being senior to General Drummond; and lastly, he is not unknown to our troops that are there.
Prevost that charges had been ]aid against him by Sir
When news of Napoleon's escape reached Canada, followed soon after by reports of the renewal of war with France, Murray became restless, and applied for an active service post with Wellington. Official approval was forthcoming, and he left the province in July without having met the local legislature which had been prorogued before his appointment. Murray missed the battle of Waterloo, but remained for three years as chief of staff to the army of occupation in France. He was elected to the House .of Commons for the first time in 1828, and in the following year was made a fellow of the Royal Society. From 1828 to 1830 he served as Secretary of State for War and Colonies in the short-lived Wellington Government, and during this brief period his impact on Canadian affairs, while infrequent, was vigorous and in some respects enduring.
He was, however, obviously no Huskisson either in political capacity or in knowledge; he was simply filling in, and, in the his troops in order, but he is too good natured to exert himself about it, and he would require some assistance in that way. He has talents and God knows experience enough for any situation, and he might command in chief as well as anybody else; but I should be inclined to doubt it; and to have him fail as well as our troops would be terrible. As to the security of the British Power in these Provinces, it appears to me that the Roots of that Power are at the sea; and that in strengthening it we should proceed from the base upwards, and n.ot begin at the other extremity.
As far as I can yet form an opinion the weakest part of the Kings Dominions here is from Montreal to Kingston. The mfiitary means of giving strength to that quarter I will speak of at another time; the most important object to attend to at present, I think, is to add as much as possible to its population by Loyal Settlers. There are at present some very good Scottish Settlers (part Roman Catholic) in Glengarry and Stormont; and above that, as far as Brockville, there are some very good Germans, Emigrants from the United States after the first American War. The Settlers higher up differ very little (with some exceptions) from their neighbours upon the opposite side of the 
In regard to this tendency to assimilate with the Americans of the United

8d Apl Inclosed in Sir George Murray's letter 27 March 1815
Memorandum about the proposed Naval Establishment upon Lake Huron There are very considerable obstacles in the way of forming a Naval Establishment upon Lake Huron.--The most obvious of these is the difficulty of Commtmication, and of the Transport of Stores from Lake Ontario to Penetanguishene, the point at which it is supposed the Establishment could with most advantage be placed.
One of the Grounds upon which it was deemed expedient to form a Naval Establishment upon Lake Huron was, that it was supposed the Enemy might direct an Expedition by that Route, to act in the Rear of the Troops employed in defending the Western Extremities of the Upper Province.
It is to be observed however, that the real obstacles which we find opposing themselves to our own design of .opening a Communication to the Shores of Lake Huron, would in a still greater degree obstruct an attempt of the Enemy to penetrate from that side with a force of any magnitude.
In addition to this, it is fttrther to be remarked also that any Expedition of the nature above alluded to, could .only be attempted in co-operation with a more important and more direct Attack.--And that the improbability .of any efficient co-operation, by Lake Huron is so great, on account of it's remoteness from the Main Attack, and the uncertainties and difficulties it would be liable to encounter in its progress, that an Enemy could calculate but little upon any benefit resulting from it;--and consequenfiy, that we have little reason to dread it.
It has been suggested, in fayour of the proposed Establishment, however, that our facilities for forming a Navy upon Lake Huron are greater than those possessed by the Enemy :--This opinion it is apprehended rests upon mis-information:--The Americans are said to have very considerable facilities for building Vessels upon that part .of the St. Clair River which is between Lake St. Clair .and Lake Huron; higher up the River than the Shoal which it has been stated would obstruct the Passage into that Lake, of any Vessels which they might construct in Lake Erie, or in the vicinity of Detroit.--There seems no reason to believe therefore but that they could eompeat with us advantageously in Naval means upon Lake Huron; and this is the less to be doubted, ff we suppose that the previous Operations .of the War may have put them in possession of the Country, on the Left Bank of the St. Glair River, a supposition which should naturally precede the expectation of any rash Attack upon the Center parts of the Upper Pr. ovinee, as it would be material to the Enemy, to assist by a co-operation through Lake Huron.
It appears suttleiently demonstrated therefore, that it is not at present an essential object to attempt the formation of a Naval Establishment upon Lake Huron, with a view to the Mfiitary Defence of the Upper Provinee;--and indeed it might have •been further urged, that looking to the possibfiity of failure in the competition for Naval superiority upon that Lake, we should 
